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Abstract. This paper presents an enhanced password authentication
scheme by systematically exploiting the motion sensors in a smartwatch.
We extract unique features from the sensor data when a smartwatch
bearer types his/her password (or PIN), and train certain machine learn-
ing classiﬁers using these features. We then implement smartwatch-aided
password authentication using the classiﬁers. Our scheme is user-friendly
since it does not require users to perform any additional actions when
typing passwords or PINs other than wearing smartwatches. We conduct
a user study involving 51 participants on the developed prototype so as
to evaluate its feasibility and performance. Experimental results show
that the best classiﬁer for our system is the Bagged Decision Trees, for
which the accuracy is 4.58% FRR and 0.12% FAR on the QWERTY
keyboard, and 6.13% FRR and 0.16% FAR on the numeric keypad.
Keywords: Wearable devices · User authentication · Sensor · Machine
learning
1 Introduction
A smartwatch is a computerized wristwatch with functionalities beyond time-
keeping. The use of smartwatch has become a rising trend in today’s consumer
electronics. Equipped with rich sensors, smartwatches can be used in many
applications such as monitoring heart rate, steps taken and calories burned.
In recent studies, smartwatch sensor data are exploited to conduct keystroke
inference attacks. When a user types on a keyboard or PIN pad wearing a smart-
watch, an attacker may access the user’s smartwatch sensor data and infer what
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the user types from the sensor data, thus compromising user’s security or pri-
vacy [7,8,15,16]. While prior studies reveal that smartwatch sensor data can be
exploited for launching attacks, we further reveal that such data contain unique
features of users’ typing behaviors beyond what users type, and thus can be
exploited to enhance password authentication against known password attacks
and keystroke imitation attacks. An enhance password authentication system is
still reliable even if an adversary knows a user’s password and can imitate the
user’s keystroke dynamics.
In particular, we extract unique features from smartwatch sensor data when
a smartwatch bearer types his/her password (or PIN), and train certain machine
learning classiﬁers using these features. We then design a smartwatch-aided
password authentication scheme using the trained classiﬁers. We show that our
scheme can defend against the keystroke imitation attack proposed in [9]. Even
if an adversary obtains users’ passwords and imitates users’ keystroke dynamics,
our system can still diﬀerentiate imitators from legitimate users by analyzing
smartwatch sensor data during password entry.
Our scheme is user-friendly since it does not require users to perform any
additional actions when typing passwords or PINs other than wearing their
smartwatches. The performance of our scheme is evaluated in an IRB-approved
user study with 51 participants. Five widely used classiﬁcation algorithms are
evaluated in which the best performer turns out to be the Bagged Decision Trees.
Rigorous experiments on the accuracy of our scheme are conducted in our user
study, yielding 4.58% FRR and 0.12 FAR on the QWERTY keyboard, and 6.13%
FRR and 0.16% FAR on the numeric keypad. It is also shown that the keystroke
imitation attack has insigniﬁcant impact to the accuracy of our scheme.
2 Background
2.1 Smartwatch and Sensor Dynamics
There are various sensors on smartwatches to collect information about users,
including accelerometer, gyroscope, heart rate sensor, and microphone. We
choose Moto 360 sport, which is powered by Android Wear OS, for our eval-
uation purpose. We collect data from accelerometer and gyroscope for the pur-
pose of user authentication. The built-in motion sensor is an InvenSense MPU
6051 Six-Axis (Gyroscope + Accelerometer) MEMS motion tracking device,
which can measure the accelerations and angular velocities of movement in x-,
y- and z-axis regardless of the orientation of watch. Accelerometer and gyro-
scope in smartwatches have been extensively used in user behavioral characteri-
zation, including sensor-based keystroke inference [7,8,15,16]. The basic idea is
that the sensor data provide necessary information which can be used to accu-
rately recognize the hand movements performed by users wearing smartwatches.
Instead of using such sensor data for keystroke inference, we use them for user
authentication.
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Fig. 1. Keystroke timings used in keystroke dynamics techniques.
2.2 Keystroke Dynamics
Keystroke dynamics refers to the timing information associated with key-press
events. Two types of key-press events are usually used in modeling keystroke
dynamics, including (a) key-down event (KD): a user presses a key and (b) key-
up event (KU ): a user releases a key. One or more possible keystroke timings
associated with consecutive key-press events, e.g., KD-KU time and KD-KD
time, are considered as keystroke dynamics features in [6] and shown in Fig. 1.
Keystroke dynamics features have been used to identify and authenticate users
on both hardware keyboards [1,5,17] and software keyboards [13,14]. However,
Meng et al. [9] revealed that a training interface can be set up to help attack-
ers imitate users’ keystroke dynamics, which makes it unsafe to use keystroke
dynamics for user authentication. Because keystroke dynamics contains only the
timing information about users’ keystroke, it is possible for an attacker to imitate
a user’s keystroke via a training interface. To address this problem, we model
a user’s typing behavior using both acceleration data and angular velocity data
from the user’s smartwatch. It is diﬃcult for an attacker to imitate a user’s
typing behavior in our model without accessing the victims’ smartwatch sensor
data.
3 Assumptions
It is assumed that a user (the victim) wears a smartwatch such as Apple Watch
or Moto 360 Sport, while he/she types passwords and PINs. The smartwatch is
equipped with accelerometer and gyroscope which collect the motion information
of the victim’s wrist. If the victim uses one hand to type, the smartwatch is
worn on the same hand. As smartwatches are widely used, it is not uncommon
to make such assumption in daily life. We focus on two types of keyboards in
this paper, including QWERTY keyboards and numeric keyboards, which can
be used on PCs, mobile devices, Point of Sale (POS) terminals and Automatic
Teller Machines (ATMs).
An attacker intends to login to a user/victim’s account after the attacker
obtains the victim’s username and password/PIN. The attacker may observe
or record the victim’s entry of passwords or PINs. However, it is assumed that
the attacker cannot obtain any sensor data about the victim’s typing of pass-
words/PINs from the victim’s smartwatch; instead, the attacker has the following
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capabilities. First, the attacker may obtain the victim’s username and password
(e.g., by shoulder-surﬁng attack or key logger). Second, the attacker may obtain
the victim’s keystroke timing data and imitate the victim’s keystroke as shown
in [9]. In attacks, the attacker may wear a same kind of smartwatch and access
to a same kind of keyboard as the victim’s.
4 Scheme Design
4.1 Overview
The main goal of our design is to demonstrate that using smartwatches can help
enhance the security of password authentication systems. Password authentica-
tion systems suﬀer from password observation attacks such as shoulder surﬁng
and key logger in which attackers may obtain users’ passwords. We design and
implement a system which can distinguish legitimate users from illegitimate users
by processing the sensor data from the smartwatches worn on legitimate users’
wrists. Even if an attacker types in the same password as a victim, the attacker’s
hand motion is diﬀerent from the user’s. The accelerometer and gyroscope in a
smartwatch can be used to track its wearer’s hand motion during password
input. As smartwatches are widely used nowadays, our system does not require
any additional actions when typing passwords/PINs other than wearing smart-
watches, making our system user-friendly. Our system can be employed as long
as a smartwatch is worn on the user’s wrist when the user types a password/PIN
on a keyboard, or keypad of any device such as PC, ATM, and mobile phone.
Our system takes as input the password and the raw sensor data (e.g., accel-
eration, angular velocity) from the smartwatch worn on a user’s wrist. The pass-
word and the raw sensor data are sent to our server for veriﬁcation. The password
is for the conventional password authentication while the raw sensor data are
processed to further verify the user. Our system consists of two phases, the train-
ing phase and the detection phase. During the training phase, the password is
registered for the conventional password authentication and the raw sensor data
are recorded. The raw sensor data are then processed according to our feature
extraction method which translates all the recorded sensor data into features
suitable for our classiﬁer. After the features are extracted, we train the classiﬁer
with these features. During the detection phase, the system veriﬁes the password
ﬁrst. If the typed password is correct, it extracts features from the sensor data
and inputs the extracted features into the classiﬁer so as to verify the user. The
classiﬁer matches the features extracted from the sensor data against all the
known user proﬁles to identify whether the password is typed by the legitimate
user. A user is authenticated only if both the password is correct and the typing
pattern matches the user’s proﬁle.
As the conventional password authentication has been rigorously investi-
gated, we focus on how to use machine learning techniques to process the sen-
sor data of smartwatches and match users’ proﬁles. We collect the sensor data
when users type passwords on QWERTY keyboards or PINs on numeric key-
pads. QWERTY keyboards and numeric keypads are mainstream devices for
inputting passwords and PINs nowadays, respectively. As long as a user types
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passwords or PINs with the hand wearing the smartwatch, the sensor data can
help authenticate the user. We extract unique features from the sensor data and
train certain classiﬁers using the features as user proﬁles. The classiﬁers are used
to authenticate users.
4.2 Data Collection
Our system collects the accelerometer and gyroscope data within a time win-
dow from a smartwatch worn on a user’s wrist. The time window begins when
the user begins to type a password or PIN, and ends once the user presses
“Enter” to ﬁnish the input. The data from accelerometer and gyroscope are
streams of timestamped real values along three axes. For a given timestamp, t,
the accelerometer data are in the form of a(t) = (ax, ay, az) while the gyroscope
data are in the form of ω(t) = (ωx, ωy, ωz). Note that the accelerometer data
are aﬀected by the earth gravity, so when the smartwatch is lying ﬂat on the
desk, the accelerometer data show that there is an acceleration of 9.8m/s2 along
the z-axis. We can install an app in each smartwatch used in our experiment to
collect the sensor data. The app is given the permission to access the accelerom-
eter and gyroscope of the smartwatch. The app is also given the permission to
communicate with the password input interface and obtain the timing informa-
tion when the user begins typing and when the user ﬁnishes typing. According
to the timing information, the app collects the sensor data and sends the data
to our server which is used to authenticate users. We collect the sensor data
in both the training phase and the detection phase. In the training phase, we
collect enough data to train certain classiﬁers. Assuming it takes 6 s for a user
to type in a password or PIN, it will take 10min to type in the password 100
times, which is enough for training. In the detection phase, the app collects the
sensor data when the user types the password or PIN and send the data to our
server to verify whether the user is legitimate.
4.3 Feature Extraction
The raw data from accelerometer and gyroscope are streams of timestamped
real values along three axes. We extract temporal features from these data for
authentication purpose. We summarize the features that we extract from the
sensor data streams in Table 1 [3]. The detail of these features have been docu-
mented previously in report [2]. Since there are three axes for both sensors, we
obtain a vector of 36 elements after extracting the features from a sensor data
stream. Our server extracts the aforementioned features for certain classiﬁer in
both the training phase and the detection phase. In the training phase, all the
extracted features are used to train the classiﬁer, while in the detection phase,
the features are used to authenticate the user according to the classiﬁer.
4.4 Supervised Learning and Detection
In the training phase, after the system extracts all the features, it trains the
classiﬁer using the features. In Sect. 5, we evaluate ﬁve widely used classiﬁca-
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Table 1. Extracted features.
Feature Description
Mean strength Arithmetic mean of the signal strength
Standard deviation Standard deviation of the signal strength
Average deviation Average deviation from mean
Skewness Measure of asymmetry about mean
Kurtosis Measure of the ﬂatness or spikiness of a distribution
RMS Square root of arithmetic mean of squares of the signal
strength
tion algorithms, including Support Vector Machine (SVM), k-Nearest Neighbor
(k-NN), Bagged Decision Trees (Matlab’s Treebagger model), Naive Bayes clas-
siﬁer and Discriminant Analysis classiﬁer. We discover that the Bagged Decision
Trees outperforms the other classiﬁers in Sect. 5. In the detection phase, a fea-
ture vector is extracted from the sensor data of a user’s smartwatch, and fed
into a trained classiﬁer which generates the authentication result: whether the
user is legitimate or illegitimate.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Experimental Setup
To collect the sensor data when a user wearing a smartwatch types in a password
or PIN, we setup a data collection system which consists of four components,
a keyboard, a laptop, a mobile phone and a smartwatch. Figure 2(a) illustrates
our data collection system. A user just needs to wear a smartwatch and type in
passwords on the laptop using the keyboard. The sensor data will be recorded
automatically on the mobile phone.
Fig. 2. Overview of our experiment.
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Keyboard. We use a DELL SK-8115 keyboard for data collection. Users type
passwords on the QWERTY keyboard and type PINs on the numeric keypad.
Laptop. The laptop is a MacBook Pro with an Intel i7 2.7GHz processor with
8GiB RAM, running an Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit virtual machine. We obtain the
source code of the data collection system from the authors of [9] and rebuild
their system. We modify their system for our experiments. The main functions
of the modiﬁed system include providing tasks for users to type, judging whether
users’ inputs are correct and sending control information to the mobile phone via
WiFi connection. The user interface is a web page for users to type in passwords
or PINs according to a prompt. When the system shows the prompt, it sends
out a “start” message to the mobile phone at the same time. Once receiving
the message, the mobile phone also sends a “start” message to the smartwatch,
which begins to record the sensor data. When the user presses “Enter” to ﬁnish
the input, the system sends a “ﬁnish” message to the mobile phone and triggers
it to send a “ﬁnish” message immediately to the smartwatch. The smartwatch
ﬁnishes its recording of the sensor data and sends the data to the phone. If the
input password is incorrect or the user presses “Backspace”, the user’s input is
erased and the system sends a “restart” message to the phone and in turn to
the smartwatch which restarts the recording of the sensor data.
Mobile Phone. The mobile phone is a Nexus 6 powered by Android 6.0. We
install an app in this phone to communicate with the laptop and the smartwatch,
as well as store the sensor data obtained from the smartwatch. The app receives
the control information from the laptop through WiFi connection and communi-
cates with the smartwatch through Bluetooth connection. After the user ﬁnishes
typing each password or PIN, the accelerometer data and gyroscope data from
the smartwatch are stored in two ﬁles respectively. Each ﬁle is a list of the sensor
data entries which contain the timestamps and the values of three axes.
Smartwatch. The smartwatch is a Moto 360 Sport, which runs on the Android
Wear platform. We install an app in this smartwatch to collect the sensor data.
When the app receives a “start” message from the phone, the app starts record-
ing accelerometer and gyroscope readings. During data collection, the sensor data
are stored locally. When the app receives a “ﬁnish” message, the sensor data are
transferred to the phone via Bluetooth. Note that the sampling frequency (50Hz)
is the highest on Moto 360 sport and we specify the SENSOR DELAY FASTEST
ﬂag at the sensor listener registration time to accomplish this.
5.2 User Study
Figure 2(b) shows the process of our user study1. We collect testing data from
51 participants in our university (students and staﬀ), including 22 males and
29 females with ages between 19 and 34 (45 of them are between 20 and 27
1 The user study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of our university.
Data collected from the participants were anonymized and protected according to
the corresponding IRB submission documents.
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years old). 26 of them are major in computer science and all of them are skilled
keyboard users. Our user study involves two sessions, and each of them takes
about 60min. Every participant takes part in Session I and we choose 9 of them
(5 males and 4 females) to take part in Session II. Each participant is paid with
10 dollars after completing each session.
Data Collection. In the data collection phase of Session I, we collect the sensor
data when each participant types a predeﬁned QWERTY keyboard password
and a predeﬁned keypad password. The QWERTY keyboard password is used
to simulate that a user types a password on a standard keyboard while the
keypad password is used to simulate that a user types a PIN on a keypad of
ATM or POS terminal. The participants are required to wear smartwatches
on their right wrists, and type in QWERTY passwords with both hands while
type in PINs with the right hands. The participants are also required to keep
standing when they type PINs, since people usually type PINs on ATMs or
POS terminals standing. We choose the QWERTY keyboard password and the
keypad password as “ths.ouR2” and “924673”, respectively in our experiment.
The password “ths.ouR2” is a strong password used in previous work [9] while
“924673” is a randomly generated PIN. The participants are required to type
each password 100 times.
Keystroke Imitation Attack. In order to ﬁnd some participants who are
good at keystroke imitation and test whether our system can resist the imita-
tion attack proposed in [9], we arrange an imitation phase in both Session I and
Session II. We rebuild the system proposed in [9] and require that each partic-
ipant uses this system to imitate a previous participant’s keystroke dynamics.
After the participant ﬁnishes each input, the system shows an interface (Fig. 3)
and a score to indicate the diﬀerences between this input and the target typing
pattern. Note that in Fig. 3, the circles mean the hold timings and the bars mean
the inter-keystroke timings. A participant can adjust his/her typing according to
the interface. In the imitation phase of Session I, we aim to ﬁnd some participants
who are good at imitation, so each participant is required to imitate a previous
participant’s typing pattern of “ths.ouR2”. We ﬁnd 9 best imitators according
to the imitation performance and they are invited to take part in Session II. In
Session II, the participants are required to imitate other two participants’ typing
Fig. 3. The interface of the imitation system (Fig. 3 in [9]). The circles mean the hold
timings and the bars mean the inter-keystroke timings. The blue circles and bars are
the target’s timing information. Imitators can adjust their typing according to the
diﬀerences between their timing information and the target’s. (Color ﬁgure online)
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patterns of “ths.ouR2” and “924673”. Similar to the conclusion drawn in [9], we
discover that it is unable to distinguish these imitators from the victims accord-
ing to the keystroke dynamics only, but we aim to ﬁnd out whether it is possible
to distinguish them by analyzing the sensor data taken from smartwatches.
5.3 Performance Analysis
Data Processing. To show the performance of our system on both QWERTY
keyboard and numeric keypad, we process the sensor data collected when the
51 participants type “ths.ouR2” and “924673”. The participants are required to
type in the same password as we aim to ﬁnd out whether the sensor data can
help diﬀerentiate them. After deleting the invalid data caused by system error,
we extract the features according to Sect. 4.3 and obtain 4,789 feature vectors for
the QWERTY keyboard and 4,868 feature vectors for the numeric keyboard. For
each participant, we have approximately 93 feature vectors, including the mean
values of the three axis of the accelerometer. We delete some outliers based on
the accelerometer data as follows. We ﬁrst calculate the mean value M and the
standard deviation D of the mean strengths, and then calculate the diﬀerence
between M and each mean strength. If the diﬀerence is larger than three times
of D, we delete the corresponding feature vector. In addition, if the D values of
some participants are three times higher than others, we also delete these data
to improve the quality of the collected data. In total, we delete 759 out of 4,789
feature vectors for the QWERTY keyboard and 609 out of 4,868 feature vectors
for the numeric keypad. To access the performance, we use FAR (false acceptance
rate), which indicates the fraction of imposter access attempts identiﬁed as valid
users, and FRR (false rejection rate), which indicates the fraction of valid user
attempts identiﬁed as impostors.
Performance of Diﬀerent Classiﬁers. We evaluate the performance of ﬁve
classiﬁers, including Support Vector Machine (SVM), k-Nearest Neighbor (k-
NN), Bagged Decision Trees (Matlab’s Treebagger model), Naive Bayes classiﬁer
and Discriminant Analysis classiﬁer. For training and testing of these classiﬁers,
we randomly select 50% of the feature vectors for each participant as a train-
ing set while the remaining 50% as a testing set. To prevent any bias in our
experiments, we randomize the training and testing sets 10 times and compute
the average accuracy. Our experimental results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. In
the tables, “keyboard (improved)” and “keypad (improved)” mean the improved
data set derived by removing outliers from the original data set. The results show
that the Bagged Decision Trees outperforms the other classiﬁers and its accuracy
is 4.58% FRR and 0.12% FAR on the QWERTY keyboard, and 6.13% FRR and
0.16% FAR on the numeric keypad.
Impact of Diﬀerent Sensors. To understand the impact of diﬀerent sensors,
we also test our system using the data from one sensor only. Figure 4 shows the
evaluation results with the Bagged Decision Trees. In all cases, using accelerom-
eter only can reach almost the same accuracy as using both sensors, while using
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SVM 18.15% 11.79% 14.81% 5.46% 14.00% 6.64%
k-NN 28.03% 20.02% 22.10% 9.23% 20.99% 8.80%
BDT 4.58% 6.13% 1.93% 1.51% 2.03% 3.41%
Naive Bayes 8.79% 11.03% 12.02% 6.97% 11.42% 9.34%
DAC 6.08% 6.09% 1.72% 1.51% 1.47% 3.95%














SVM 0.43% 0.28% 1.5% 0.47% 1.3% 0.63%
k-NN 0.67% 0.48% 2.2% 0.83% 1.9% 0.80%
BDT 0.12% 0.16% 0.21% 0.15% 0.24% 0.47%
Naive Bayes 0.21% 0.26% 1.2% 0.78% 0.78% 1.0%
DAC 0.14% 0.14% 0.17% 0.15% 0.08% 0.04%
Fig. 4. The accuracy (FRR) when using only one sensor.
gyroscope only results in lower accuracy. Nonetheless, using both sensors can
improve the accuracy by about 3% compared to using accelerometer only. As a
result, we use both sensors in our system.
5.4 Defending Against Keystroke Imitation Attack
To test whether our system can defend against the keystroke imitation attack
proposed in [9], we process the sensor data when nine selected participants
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imitate others. Note that the selected participants are the best imitators among
the 51 participants selected in Session I. In Session II, they are requested to imi-
tate other two participants’ typing patterns on QWERTY keyboard and numeric
keypad. We have reproduced the results of [9] with these nine participants. After
trained with the system proposed in [9], the selected participants can imitate the
target typing patterns in a success rate higher than 90%. To test whether our sys-
tem can diﬀerentiate original users from imitators, we ﬁrst extract the features
from the sensor data collected from the original users and from the imitators,
respectively. We then randomly select 50% of the feature vectors from each per-
son to train the classiﬁers. The other 50% of the feature vectors are used as the
testing set. The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. In the ﬁrst round of imita-
tion, the results show that the accuracy of the Bagged Decision Trees is 1.93%
FRR and 0.21 FAR on the standard keyboard, and 1.51% FRR and 0.15% FAR
on the numeric keypad. In the second round of imitation, the accuracy of the
Bagged Decision Trees is 2.03% FRR and 0.24 FAR on the standard keyboard,
and 3.41% FRR and 0.47% FAR on the numeric keypad. The keystroke imitation
attack has little impact on our system.
6 Related Work
Sensor Information Leaks on Smartwatches. Previous research has studied
sensor information leaks on smartwatches [7,8,15,16]. Wang et al. [16] propose a
linguistic model based system to infer user typed words on a standard keyboard
using accelerometer and gyroscope data in smartwatches. Their system is unable
to deal with non-contextual inputs, such as passwords and PIN sequences, since
the system relies on a linguistic model. Liu et al. [7] make use of the sensors
in smartwatches, including accelerometer and microphone, to infer users’ inputs
on keyboards or POS terminals. Their approach is based on machine-learning
techniques and training of hand movements between keystrokes. Maiti et al. [8]
also make use of the sensors in smartwatches to infer users’ input, and present
a protection framework to regulate sensor access. Wang et al. [15] propose a
training-free and contextual-free system to infer users’ input by exploiting the
sensors in wearable devices, including accelerometers, gyroscopes and magne-
tometers. Their system does not require any training or contextual information.
Keystroke Dynamics. Tremendous eﬀorts have been made on using keystroke
dynamics as biometrics (e.g., [10–12]). However, Meng et al. [9] propose a feed-
back and training interface, called Mimesis, which can help one person imitate
another through incremental adjustment of typing patterns. If an attacker can
obtain the information of a victim’s typing pattern, the attacker can imitate the
victim with the help of Mimesis. This makes keystroke dynamics based authen-
tication systems insecure. Giuﬀrida et al. [4] propose sensor-enhanced keystroke
dynamics to authenticate users typing on mobile devices. They use motion sensor
data to characterize users typing behavior and use machine learning techniques
to perform user authentication. However, their system works on mobile devices
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only. When users type passwords on standard keyboards or PINs on keypads,
their system does not work. In comparison, our solution is more generic, since
the smartwatch is worn on the user’s wrist. Wherever the user types, our system
can obtain the sensor data which reﬂect the motions of the user’s wrist, and thus
authenticate the user by analyzing the sensor data.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose to use smartwatches to track the motion of users’
wrists when they type passwords on standard keyboards or numeric keypads. In
particular, we present a novel enhanced password authentication scheme by sys-
tematically exploiting the motion sensors in the users’ smartwatches. The exper-
imental results show that the best classiﬁer for our system achieves an accuracy
of 4.58% FRR and 0.12% FAR on the QWERTY keyboard, and 6.13% FRR and
0.16% FAR on the numeric keypad. Our work paves the way for authenticating
users using smartwatch sensor data and machine learning techniques.
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